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Governmental organizations commonly seek to cut costs and increase efficiency 
through consolidation and standardization of information technology (IT) infrastructure. 
This may result in vulnerabilities not typically considered by policymakers, due to 
concentration and homogenization of critical assets, elimination of redundancy and surge 
capacity, and tightly coupled systems. This thesis reviewed the potential vulnerabilities 
that may exist in consolidated IT systems due to the effects of complexity, self-organized 
criticality, and monoculture, and shows that efficient systems carry inherent 
vulnerabilities. Because we cannot mitigate every possible threat, hazard, or 
vulnerability, IT professionals should focus on system resilience. Resilience of a system 
is counter-proportional to the product of vulnerability and spectral radius; therefore, any 
increase in vulnerability, spectral radius, or both decreases resilience. A reduction in 
overall vulnerability can compensate for increased self-organization and other losses of 
resilience through a variety of recommended actions. Many of those actions come with a 
cost—organizations will have to determine the tradeoffs they are willing to make 
between efficiency and security. 
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Governments, like other organizations dealing with budgetary pressures, typically 
search for ways to increase efficiency and effectiveness. One common way of cutting 
costs and increasing efficiency is to consolidate information technology (IT) systems. IT 
is a critical component of the nation’s infrastructure, economy, and government 
operations; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security designated the IT sector as one of 
the seventeen critical infrastructure sectors.1 The state of Illinois is currently undergoing 
a consolidation of all state agency IT systems with the goal of a highly centralized and 
optimized monoculture environment.2 However, policymakers typically do not consider 
whether concentration and homogenization of critical assets, elimination of redundancy 
and surge capacity, and tight coupling may result in other system vulnerabilities.  
This thesis considers theories and research that indicate highly connected, hyper-
efficient systems contain the seeds of their own failures.3 The focus is specifically on the 
potential vulnerabilities that exist in consolidated IT systems due to the effects of 
complexity, self-organized criticality (SOC), and monoculture, as well as the impact of 
those effects on system resilience. The thesis includes a high-level analysis of current and 
potential weaknesses that result from complexity and hardware and software 
monocultures, as well as the potential impact of heavy usage of cloud computing. The 
thesis also includes a representative analysis of the consolidation in Illinois that began in 
2015.  
Through quantification of self-organization, we determine system vulnerability 
and resilience in order to help understand how to mitigate the identified vulnerabilities. 
The two main drivers of self-organizing networks—percolation and preferential 
                                                 
1 “Information Technology Sector,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed March 26, 2017, 
https://www.dhs.gov/information-technology-sector. 
2 Illinois Office of the Secretary of State, Executive Order Consolidating Multiple Information 
Technology Functions into a Single Department of Innovation and Technology, Illinois Executive Order 
2016-01 (Springfield, IL: Senate of Illinois Executive Department, 2016), https://www2.illinois.gov/ 
Documents/ExecOrders/2016/ExecutiveOrder2016-01.pdf. 
3 Ted G. Lewis, Bak’s Sandpile: Strategies for a Catastrophic World, Kindle ed. (Williams, CA: Agile 
Press, 2011), loc. 32. 
 xvi 
attachment—are combined into a single quantity called spectral radius. As SOC 
increases, so does spectral radius. Vulnerability is defined as the probability of collapse 
when an asset such as a hardware or software component is stressed. System vulnerability 
relates to stresses such as monoculture, surge capacity, and weakness in nodes or links. 
Higher values of vulnerability mean lower values of resilience, also. When we combine 
vulnerability (v) and spectral radius (r) into a product (vr), we combine the effects of 
SOC with the effects of stresses into a single measure of fragility. The system’s structure 
determines how resilient the system is, not simply each component’s weakness.  
The thesis concludes that vulnerability increases with consolidation and 
optimization, thereby reducing system resilience. While high-consequence, extreme 
events happen less frequently than smaller-consequence events, with increased vr the big 
events will be even more damaging.4 The objective of resilient system design is to reduce 
v, r, or both. Examples of both pre-consolidation and anticipated post-consolidation 
portions of the Illinois network were analyzed for resilience by simulating cascades 
initiated by failure of a randomly chosen node. This analysis demonstrated an 
increasingly self-organized and fragile system.  
The research concludes that when consolidating and centralizing to save money, 
system designers and administrators need to take special precautions to offset the 
downside of centralization and standardization with extra vulnerability-reducing 
precautions. This typically means that hardware and software systems and 
communication networks must be hardened even more against accidental and deliberate 
attacks. That is, vulnerability must be reduced to compensate for the increase in self-
organization. Mathematically, this means vulnerability (v) must be reduced to offset 
spectral radius (r).  
Because vulnerability is counter-proportional to resilience, the thesis recommends 
reducing overall vulnerability in order to compensate for increased self-organization and 
loss of resilience. Vulnerabilities in an enterprise system can be the result of a variety of 
issues, including design flaws in software or hardware, or organizational policy 
                                                 
4 Lewis, loc. 872. 
 xvii 
weaknesses. Examples of typical vulnerabilities and countermeasures are provided. 
Recommendations regarding identified areas of vulnerability in cloud computing as well 
as suggestions for mitigating SOC and monoculture are also provided. Although we 
cannot mitigate for every possible threat, hazard, or vulnerability, organizations should 
focus on actions that will increase resilience, several of which are proposed. There will be 
a cost to many of the proposed solutions, but they are flexible enough to allow 
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Information technology (IT) is a critical component of the nation’s infrastructure, 
economy, and government operations. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) has designated the IT sector as one of the seventeen critical infrastructure 
sectors.1 Each of the other critical infrastructure sectors also rely on the IT sector’s 
products, making efforts to ensure the security and resilience of the sector even more 
important.2 
Governments, like other organizations dealing with budgetary pressures, typically 
search for ways to increase efficiency and effectiveness. One common way of cutting 
costs and increasing efficiency is to consolidate IT systems. Illinois is currently 
undergoing a consolidation of all state agency IT systems with the goal of creating a 
highly centralized and optimized environment.3 The federal government, as well as many 
other states are attempting—or have attempted—consolidations for similar reasons.4 It 
makes sense to reduce costs and it seems wasteful to have redundant systems with excess 
capacity. State and federal budgets have faced considerable pressure for decades, so 
reducing spending that could otherwise be used for something else or to reduce taxes has 
long been a priority of political leaders.  
Generally not considered, however, is whether concentration and homogenization 
of critical assets, elimination of redundancy and surge capacity, and extreme connectivity 
results in other system vulnerabilities. Theories and research developed over the last three 
                                                 
1 “Information Technology Sector,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed March 26, 2017, 
https://www.dhs.gov/information-technology-sector. 
2 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Information Technology Sector-Specific Plan (ITSSP): An 
Annex to the NIPP 2013 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2016), www.dhs.gov/sit 
es/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-information-technology-2016-508.pdf. 
3 Illinois Office of the Secretary of State, Executive Order Consolidating Multiple Information 
Technology Functions into a Single Department of Innovation and Technology, Illinois Executive Order 
2016-01 (Springfield, IL: Senate of Illinois Executive Department, 2016), https://www2.illinois.gov/ 
Documents/ExecOrders/2016/ExecutiveOrder2016-01.pdf. 
4 “Introducing the IT Shared Services Strategy,” White House, May 2, 2012, https://obamawhite 
house.archives.gov/blog/2012/05/02/introducing-it-shared-services-strategy; Madeleine Bayard and Erin 
Lee, “Review of State Information Technology Consolidation Efforts” (issue brief, NGA Center for Best 
Practices, 2005), https://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/0512Consolidationissuebrief.pdf. 
 2 
decades are proving that the most efficient systems can be the most fragile, susceptible to 
failure from slight perturbations that can cascade through the system.5 The more tightly 
coupled the system, the more potential exists for catastrophic failure.  
Making the assumption that we cannot mitigate every possible threat, hazard, or 
vulnerability, we should focus on resilience. According to DHS, resilience means the 
“ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover 
from disruption.”6 But efficient systems carry inherent vulnerabilities; how do we 
balance efficiency and resiliency to ensure system security? 
A. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
To provide better understanding and define specifically what is meant when using 
the phrase “information technology” or “IT,” this thesis uses the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) definition. NIST defines IT as follows: 
Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment that 
is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, 
movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or 
reception of data or information by the executive agency …. The term 
information technology includes computers, ancillary equipment, 
software, firmware and similar procedures, services (including support 
services), and related resources.7 
Additionally, “hardware” refers to physical components of a system. This 
includes personal computers and devices but, as part of network infrastructure, hardware 
also includes items such as routers and switches. Software, on the other hand, refers to 
programs and instructions given to the hardware to perform tasks. “Network” is defined 
for this thesis as interconnected components that include both hardware and software.  
                                                 
5 Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Kurt Wiesenfeld, “Self-Organized Criticality: An Explanation of 1/f 
Noise,” Physical Review Letters 59, no. 4 (July 27, 1987): 381–84. 
6 DHS Security Risk Steering Committee, DHS Risk Lexicon: 2010 Edition (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2010), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs-risk-
lexicon-2010_0.pdf. 
7 Richard Kissel (Ed.), Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, NISTIR 7298 Revision 2, 
(Gaithersburg, MD: NIST, 2013), 100, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2013/NIST.IR.7298r2.pdf. 
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B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY—CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Certain national infrastructure components have been deemed “so vital to the 
United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination 
thereof.”8 Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD 21) establishes a national policy to 
ensure unity of effort in order to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure.9 Information 
technology now underlies all of the other sectors, making it vitally important to reduce 
risks and ensure system resiliency. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review notes that 
potential adversaries are probing our critical infrastructure, which could result in 
significant damage to the country and economy.10   
The IT sector includes businesses and individuals that provide IT hardware, 
software, systems, and services.11 It is also closely linked with, but separate from, the 
communications sector, which is characterized by physical and electronic means of 
communication. The communications sector “has evolved from a largely mechanical, 
circuit-switched network carrying voice telephone calls … to a highly complex integrated 
system of computer-controlled, packet-based networks carrying voice, data, and 
video.”12 The IT sector continues to rapidly evolve as well. Trends in the sector include 
increased use of cloud computing, deployment of internet-connected devices known as 
the Internet of Things, and an overall increase in operational complexity.13 As described 
in the Information Technology Sector-Specific Plan Annex (ITSSP) to the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, “unlike some other Sectors, the IT Sector is a functions-
                                                 
8 “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” DHS, last updated July 11, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/critical-
infrastructure-sectors.  
9 President of the United States, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, PPD-21 (Washington, 
DC, 2013) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
10 Department of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2014), 7, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/2014_Quadren 
nial_Defense_Review.pdf. 
11 DHS, ITSSP, iii.  
12 DHS, 4. 
13 DHS, 3. 
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based Sector that comprises not only physical assets, but also virtual systems and 
networks that enable key capabilities and services in both the public and private 
sectors.”14 So physical assets as well as virtual ones need to be hardened and protected.  
Physically hardening the location of IT hardware is relatively straightforward. We 
can keep servers, switches, and computers behind locked doors and secured facilities. We 
can also harden facilities against naturally occurring events, such as tornadoes or 
earthquakes. But the virtual aspect, the network connections that open an enterprise to the 
rest of the world through the internet, can become complicated, particularly when they 
attempt to balance an organization’s security needs with the ease of use demanded by the 
end user. Additionally, the increasing use of cloud services and storage adds new 
complexity for an organization in ensuring both physical and cyber security are 
maintained by the entity providing the service. As noted by DHS, “cyberspace is 
particularly difficult to secure due to a number of factors: the ability of malicious actors 
to operate from anywhere in the world, the linkages between cyberspace and physical 
systems, and the difficulty of reducing vulnerabilities and consequences in complex cyber 
networks.”15 
The risks described in the ITSSP, however, are mainly related to deliberate, 
manmade attacks as well as an unintentional, manmade incidents and natural disasters. 
The document does not contemplate or address potential vulnerabilities from the structure 
and behavior of a system itself.  
While critical infrastructure systems may appear simple, they typically evolve 
from disparate collections of assets toward a more connected, efficient structure and 
greater levels of self-organization.16 This self-organization emerges over time as a result 
of centralization, reduction in surge capacity and redundancy, and development of a 
monoculture. For instance, the goal of optimizing systems to be as efficient as possible, 
                                                 
14 DHS, iii. 
15 “Cybersecurity Overview,” DHS, accessed November 18, 2017 https://www.dhs.gov/cybersecurity-
overview.  
16 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked 
Nation 2nd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 64. 
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particularly within a consolidated information technology environment, is more of a 
continuous evolution than a structure that becomes designed as more and more pieces are 
joined together. Dr. Ted Lewis states that “self-organized systems are typically 
nonredundant, nonsurge capable single-point-of-failure systems with bottlenecks, overly 
concentrated assets, and inadequate backup capacity.”17 Yet this type of vulnerability is 
not addressed in national critical infrastructure planning.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSOLIDATIONS OF INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
Many public-sector organizations, including Illinois state agencies, have 
historically operated independent IT operations in each agency or department, each with 
its own infrastructure, often resulting in redundant systems and excess capacity. This 
independence allowed agencies to build IT infrastructure and applications that were 
customized and responsive to agency needs. When there are no overarching IT strategies 
or standardized requirements across the enterprise, infrastructure, networks, and 
applications are built on diverse hardware and software platforms.  
Government organizations, like most others, are faced with mounting pressure to 
reduce costs and deliver better services to citizens. As a result, it has become a common 
strategy and practice for organizations to consolidate and reduce IT assets. This typically 
includes reducing the number of data centers, managing all servers in a consolidated, 
networked environment, and modernizing and standardizing hardware and software 
platforms to the greatest extent possible. Budget constraints in most organizations, and 
particularly in government, often result in prioritization of the most cost-effective and 
efficient options and the elimination of redundant systems.  
Consolidated organizations often implement and manage enterprise IT systems 
that are used throughout an entire government, across all agencies. This could include 
email and network domains, hardware, and software. High levels of reliability and 
availability are required in such situations. With limited resources and a huge amount of 
infrastructure, organizations must prioritize efforts to protect critical infrastructure. 
                                                 
17 Lewis, 43. 
 6 
Which areas are more critical than others will always be up for debate, but factors to 
consider include system interdependencies, redundancy, and critical nodes.18 
Consolidation strategies usually focus on opportunities for increasing efficiency 
and lowering costs over several areas, as identified in Table 1. Organizations may choose 
any or all of these in order to completely transform the information technology 
environment or simply consolidate certain areas.  
Table 1.   Consolidation Strategies and Benefits 
Area Actions Benefits 
Infrastructure 
Data center reductions 
Energy efficiency; cost 
reduction; smaller footprint 
Increased server utilization 
Cost reduction; increased 
efficiency 
Cloud storage 
Reduction of physical 








More efficient to 
manage/maintain 
Modernize 
Easier/more efficient to 
maintain and integrate; 
improved security 
Cloud 
Reduction of physical 
assets/costs 
Staffing Pooling resources 
Potential ability to cross-
train and utilize as surge 
capacity; combined with 
standardized system—
ability to reduce force 
Governance/Procurement Standardization Increased efficiency and 
control; decreased costs 
                                                 
18 Kathi Ann Brown, Critical Path: A Brief History of Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United 
States (Fairfax, VA: Spectrum Publishing Group, 2006), 9. 
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Federal and state government policymakers have increasingly imposed 
requirements to consolidate, increase efficiency, and reduce costs. In 2010, the federal 
Office of Management and Budget initiated an effort to reduce federal data centers, 
resulting in a reported closure of over 4,300 data centers by May of 2017 and reported 
cost avoidance or savings of approximately $2.3 billion.19 The state of Louisiana has 
recently completed a consolidation of all state agency IT departments as well as certain 
system upgrades, claiming close to $70 million in savings.20 The state of New York 
launched a consolidation initiative in 2012 and has reduced its number of data centers 
from fifty-three to eleven as of June of 2017, with plans to leave only two remaining.21  
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
Government leaders and IT experts are not typically aware of theories and 
research that indicate highly connected, hyper-efficient systems contain the seeds of their 
own failures.22 The consolidating and linking of so many systems may inadvertently 
introduce vulnerabilities that have not been considered. Information technology now 
underlies and connects so many basic components of daily life that its importance cannot 
be overstated.23  
The Illinois state government now relies on information technology to perform 
everything from basic administrative tasks, such as processing employee timekeeping, to 
monitoring and analyzing nuclear power plant activities. Illinois’ IT systems, among 
many other things, assist in tracking prison inmates and sex offenders, allow citizens to 
                                                 
19 Information Technology: Sustained Management Attention to the Implementation of FITARA Is 
Needed to Better Manage Acquisitions and Operations: Testimony before the Subcommittees on 
Government Operations and Information Technology, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
House of Representatives (statement of David A. Powner, June 13, 2017), 12–13, https://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/690/685231.pdf  
20 Tanya Candia, “State and Local IT Leaders Target Cybersecurity in Tech Upgrades,” StateTech, 
October 19, 2017, https://statetechmagazine.com/article/2017/10/state-and-local-it-leaders-target-
cybersecurity-tech-upgrades.  
21 Colin Wood, “‘First Thing’ for New New York State CIO Is Gathering the Right Team for IT 
Consolidation,” StateScoop, accessed November 12, 2017, http://statescoop.com/wannacry-response-was-
simple-thanks-to-consolidation-says-new-york-state-cio. 
22 Ted G. Lewis, Bak’s Sandpile: Strategies for a Catastrophic World, Kindle ed. (Williams, CA: 
Agile Press, 2011), loc. 32. 
23 DHS, ITSSP. 
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obtain professional licenses, process taxes and fees, and run incident management and 
geospatial platforms to assist in real-time disaster and event response. These systems are 
relied upon for critical functions and activities to ensure public safety and support the 
citizens and economy of Illinois. A large-scale failure would be disastrous. 
With this in mind, this thesis seeks to answer the following question: 
Consolidations of large IT systems create efficiency, but also reduce resiliency; how 
might a consolidated IT system remain resilient while being optimized for efficiency?  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is focused on the potential vulnerabilities that may exist in 
consolidated IT systems due to the effects of complexity, self-organized criticality, and 
monoculture. These theories are used to analyze the consolidation in Illinois that began in 
2015 in order to attempt to determine if vulnerability increases with consolidation and 
optimization—and, if so, the types of vulnerabilities that exist and options for mitigating 
them. A major component of Illinois’ strategy includes heavy adoption of cloud 
computing, so review and analysis of potential cloud-specific vulnerabilities are also 
included. Using system node and link details, computer algorithms are able to produce 
calculations to determine a network’s level of self-organization, vulnerability to 
cascading failures, and overall resilience.24 This thesis provides examples of this only in 
order to demonstrate how self-organization, vulnerability, and resilience can be 
calculated. A full analysis of a system and organization as large as the state of Illinois 
could be done, but would require data on all nodes and links in the network and is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. This is not intended to produce a detailed report on specific 
architecture issues, but rather a higher-level analysis of current and potential weaknesses 
as a result of complexity and hardware and software monocultures, as well as the 
potential impact of heavy usage of cloud computing. 
                                                 
24 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 355–8. 
 9 
II. THEORIES AND CONCEPTS 
This chapter provides a background of the theories and issues under 
consideration. It begins with a brief literature review, then explains what is meant by IT 
consolidation, and how and why consolidations occur. The major ideas and concepts of 
complexity theory and self-organized criticality are then discussed without deep 
exploration into the math that supports components of the theories. A background on the 
concept of monoculture is explored, focusing on the dangers and benefits of an IT 
monoculture. The chapter then reviews what it means to be resilient and why resiliency 
has become so important when dealing with disasters.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The original concept that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts is often 
attributed to Aristotle. This idea is also part of the theory of complex systems—that the 
behavior or activities produced is something more than can be explained by the 
constituent parts. How is it that individual pieces appear to be simple and understandable, 
but when large events occur they are often seemingly unexplainable? Attempting to 
understand why some accidents become catastrophes, Charles Perrow developed normal 
accident theory.25  
Smaller accidents happen regularly. However, when an accident propagates 
through a system of interdependent components, the severity of the event is compounded 
and magnified as it spreads, ultimately bringing down the entire system.26 Normal 
accident theory says this unexpected behavior is inevitable due to invisible or hidden 
linkages. Small or relatively minor failures in a tightly coupled system can cascade in 
seemingly unpredictable ways with ultimately catastrophic potential.27 So it is the 
linkages that are key to understanding why those small failures can have large impacts. 
                                                 
25 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
26 Zhang Huaxia, “Exploring Dynamics of Emergence,” Systems Research & Behavioral Science 24, 
no. 4 (July 2007): 432–3, https://doi.org/10.1002/sres.845. 
27 Perrow, Normal Accidents, 4–5. 
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According to normal accident theory, accidents in complex, tightly coupled systems are 
not only inevitable, but the interactions that occur are often unexpected and potentially 
incomprehensible. This can result in inadequate response or actions taken that make the 
failure even worse due to the responding individuals’ inability to understand what is 
occurring. The operators at Three Mile Island did not understand many of the system 
interactions that were taking place because they were not expected, which led the 
operator to make the wrong decisions and, ultimately, to the reactor meltdown.28  
In 1987, Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld experimented with grains of sand, dropping 
them one by one into a pile and observing as the pile eventually collapsed into landslides. 
Through the experiment they demonstrated that small perturbations to a system in 
equilibrium have seemingly little impact until one more small change pushes it past the 
critical point. He referred to this as self-organized criticality (SOC). It is an explanation 
for the potential for catastrophe described by normal accident theory. Bak says that large 
systems with many components have the tendency to evolve into a critical state 
demonstrated by complex behavior, wherein seemingly minor disturbances can lead to 
catastrophic events.29 As Bak states, “self-organization is an emergent process of 
complex systems whereby simplicity is gradually replaced by complexity.”30  
The theory of SOC has been studied to explain everything from earthquakes, 
traffic jams, and power outages, to the human brain. Bak’s book How Nature Works 
provides examples of self-organized critical phenomena in earthquakes, volcanoes, and 
even life itself.31 Research in a wide variety of areas is discovering evidence of self-
organization at work.  
Dr. Ted G. Lewis, in his book, Bak’s Sand Pile: Strategies for a Catastrophic 
World, proposes a unifying theory as a “step toward understanding the connections 
                                                 
28 Lewis, Bak’s Sandpile, loc. 935. 
29 Per Bak, How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality (New York: Copernicus, 
1996), 1. 
30 Lewis, Bak’s Sandpile, loc. 185. 
31 Bak, How Nature Work, 89–104. 
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between and among complex modern systems.”32 By understanding what is causing 
systemic failures, we can begin to develop policies to mitigate those failures and increase 
resiliency.33  
IT system consolidation is a form of SOC, which reduces resiliency. But 
consolidation increases efficiency, saving dollars by removing redundancy and unused 
capacity. Is it possible to have both? Is there a balance between efficiency and resiliency? 
This thesis claims it is possible to be both efficient and resilient, but IT system designers 
must be prepared to offset a decline in resiliency due to improved efficiency with 
additional vulnerability reductions to balance both. 
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CONSOLIDATIONS 
Government agencies have historically built independent IT structures in 
accordance with the needs and desires of each agency. Rather than a shared, standardized 
environment, agencies built their own data centers, set their own standards (or none), and 
built or bought multitudes of applications. And as additional equipment was purchased 
and new technologies emerged, old systems were not necessarily replaced. This led to IT 
shops with redundant systems, excess capacity, and legacy technology that can be 
difficult to maintain. As budgets and staff resources shrank, it thus became common 
strategy and practice for organizations to consolidate and reduce IT assets in an effort to 
be more efficient and lower operating costs. Common consolidation activities include 
data center and server consolidations and reductions, pooling of staff, and applications 
rationalization.  
At least half of states have consolidated or are in some stage of consolidation or 
transformation.34 The federal government has been advocating for consolidation and 
resource sharing among federal agencies for decades, and began to prioritize that goal in 
2001 when the Office of Management and Budget identified a couple dozen of what it 
                                                 
32 Lewis, Bak’s Sandpile, loc. 23. 
33 Lewis, Bak’s Sandpile, loc. 44. 
34 Bayard and Lee, “State Information Technology Consolidation Efforts.”  
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called “E-Government” initiatives.35 In 2002, Congress passed the E-Government Act.36 
The initiatives and the Act were designed to both promote and take advantage of internet-
based technology. The Act recognized that interagency cooperation and interoperability 
are often hindered by the jurisdictional boundaries created by individual agencies, and 
urged transformation of agency operations by utilizing best practices from the public and 
private sectors.37 Best practices in the private sector have long included outsourcing back 
office functions such as information technology. “Since 2004, the Treasury Department 
and the Office of Personnel Management have also taken steps toward leading shared 
services implementation across government.”38  
The Obama administration made IT shared services a priority and key initiative.39 
In 2010, the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative was launched to reduce the 
number of data centers and improve efficiency.40 Then, in 2014, the Federal Information 
Technology Acquisition Reform provisions were enacted, which required agencies to 
report on their data center inventories and plans to consolidate and achieve savings. In 
November of 2015, twenty-four participating agencies had identified 10,584 data centers 
and, of those, had reported closing 3,125, with an additional 5,203 planned for closure by 
the end of federal fiscal year 2019.41  
Concerns about IT consolidations from end users and agency leaders include loss 
of control and flexibility and lack of responsiveness, but there is little to no recognition of 
                                                 
35 “Presidential Initiatives,” White House, accessed October 28, 2017, https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/egov/c-presidential.html.  
36 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347 (2002), accessed October 28, 2017, 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ347/content-detail.html.  
37 E-Government Act of 2002.  
38 Partnership for Public Service, Helping Government Deliver II: The Obstacles and Opportunities 
Surrounding Shared Services (Arlington, VA: Deloitte, 2015), 4, https://www.govexec.com/media/gbc/ 
docs/pdfs_edit/031315cc1.pdf.  
39 Steve Vanroekel, “Introducing the IT Shared Services Strategy,” White House, May 2, 2012, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/05/02/introducing-it-shared-services-strategy.  
40 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Data Center Consolidation Agencies Making Progress, 
but Planned Savings Goals Need to Be Established, GAO-16-323 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2016), 1, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675592.pdf.  
41 GAO, 3. 
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the potential dangers of increased complexity and/or risks of monoculture due to 
infrastructure and application standardization. There is some recognition of increased 
security risk related to data center consolidation and reduction—specifically, that 
consolidation puts increased pressure on remaining data centers.42 The combination of 
strained budgets and the quest for hyper-efficiency often leads to concentrated assets and 
a system that is operated at or beyond limits, reducing surge capacity and lowering 
resiliency. Through consolidation, pieces of existing separate systems are joined together 
(coupled) and a new structure, along with SOC, emerges.43 
The following subsections discuss examples of incidents that were facilitated due 
to consolidation and concentration of assets, or, conversely, would have been worse had 
the organization not been operating in a silo and had been tightly coupled to other 
systems. 
1. AT&T Long-Distance Network Collapse 
On January 15, 1990, a switching failure caused severe disruption to AT&T’s 
network, and resulted in close to 50 percent of calls failing to go through.44 The outage 
lasted for approximately nine hours. It was ultimately determined to have been caused by 
a coding error in recently updated software.45 The tightly coupled network, however, 
allowed the failure in one switch to cascade throughout much of the system. Additionally, 
that same software was designed into a backup system that was intended to provide 
redundancy and higher reliability.46 This example illustrates the inherent dangers in a 
                                                 
42 Rick Stevenson, “Beware the Risks of Government Data Center Consolidation” Nextgov, August 
27, 2014, http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2014/08/beware-risks-government-data-center-
consolidation/92513/.. 
43 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 49. 
44 Dennis Burke, “All Circuits Are Busy Now: The 1990 AT&T Long Distance Network Collapse” 
(paper, California Polytechnic State University, 1995), 
http://users.csc.calpoly.edu/~jdalbey/SWE/Papers/att_collapse.html.  
45 Burke. 
46 Karen Tumulty, “AT&T Reaches Out to Public and Apologizes for Breakdown : 
Telecommunications: The Firm Suspects That a ‘Bug’ in Computer Software Caused Its System’s 
Collapse. It May Offer Restitution to Some and a Day of Discounted Rates to All.,” Los Angeles Times, 
January 17, 1990, http://articles.latimes.com/1990-01-17/business/fi-215_1_software-systems. 
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tightly coupled system as well as the false comfort that redundancy can bring when it is 
operated in a monoculture.  
2. Office of Personnel Management Data Breach 
In June of 2015, federal government officials disclosed a massive data breach of 
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). OPM is the human resource department for 
the federal government and is also responsible for managing the detailed personal 
information submitted by individuals seeking a security clearance.47 The breach exposed 
the data of over 25 million Americans, and over 5 million individuals’ fingerprints.48  
Security clearance data resides in a database for a suite of applications known as 
“EPIC,” and employee data resides in what is called the Electronic Official Personnel 
Folder (eOPF), hosted at the Department of Interior’s shared services data center.49 Both 
of these systems were breached. There was little segmentation in the OPM network, 
allowing the attackers, once they had breached the system, to move laterally throughout 
the environment.50  
The attackers had access to OPM’s systems for a considerable amount of time and 
were able to exfiltrate documents that described systems and interfaces, along with a list 
of contractors who had access to certain systems.51 U.S. Investigations Services, an OPM 
background investigation contractor, acknowledged a data breach of its systems in 
August 2014, resulting in personally identifiable information (PII) for 31,000 individuals 
                                                 
47 David Kennel, OPM vs. APT: How Proper Implementation of Key Controls Could Have Prevented 
a Disaster (North Bethesda, MD: The Sans Institute, 2016), 2, https://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/breaches/opm-vs-apt-proper-implementation-key-controls-prevented-disaster-36852.  
48 Kennel. 
49 Sean Gallagher, “‘EPIC’ Fail—How OPM Hackers Tapped the Mother Lode of Espionage Data,” 
Ars Technica, June 22, 2015, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/06/epic-fail-how-opm-
hackers-tapped-the-mother-lode-of-espionage-data/.  
50 The OPM Data Breach: How the Government Jeopardized Our National Security for More than a 
Generation: Majority Staff Report Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of 
Representatives, 114 Cong (September 7, 2016), 76, https://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/The-OPM-Data-Breach-How-the-Government-Jeopardized-Our-National-
Security-for-More-than-a-Generation.pdf.  
51 H.R., 66.  
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being compromised.52 Another contractor, KeyPoint, was found in December 2014 to 
have been breached as well, with possible PII compromised for over 48,000 individuals. 
The credentials of a KeyPoint employee with an OPM account were compromised during 
this breach and, according to testimony by KeyPoint CEO Eric Hess, were used to gain 
access to OPM.53  
There are multiple documented failures by OPM in basic cyber-hygiene practices 
that contributed to the breaches. They include lack of multi-factor authentication, which 
requires physical possession of a chip-enhanced ID card and would have made 
unauthorized access using stolen usernames much more unlikely.54 Almost half of 
OPM’s forty-seven systems were owned by contractors; OPM had limited oversight of 
the systems and conducted limited monitoring.55 Office of the Inspector General reports 
found unpatched servers, which can leave holes for attackers to enter through. Data was 
not encrypted, something that OPM’s director blamed on legacy systems that could not 
feasibly be encrypted.56 Although legacy systems can be encrypted, it may be more 
difficult and expensive to do so. OPM also had gaps in its logging capabilities, which 
made it impossible to definitively determine the attackers’ entry point or know for certain 
everything that may have been compromised.57  
Again, all of these deficiencies were contributors to the magnitude of the breach, 
but the number of systems linked together, along with the lack of segmentation, allowed 
the attackers to enter OPM’s environment, drop malware that allowed them to persist 
throughout the network, and then move laterally into the shared services data center at 
                                                 
52 H.R., 31.  
53 H.R., 32. 
54 H.R., 77. 
55 Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology, “Handing Over the Keys to the Castle. OPM 
Demonstrated That Antiquated Security Practices Harm National Security” (report, Institute for Critical 
Infrastructure Technology, 2015), 10, http://icitech.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ICIT-Brief-OPM-
Breach2.pdf.  
56 H.R., The OPM Data Breach, 47.  
57 H.R., 72. 
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Department of the Interior, which housed OPM personnel records.58 While poor cyber 
hygiene was a component of the OPM breach, the consolidation and centralization of the 
federal IT systems magnified the consequences. Once the hackers found a way in, they 
were able to take advantage of that centralization to access millions of consolidated 
records. 
3. Illinois State Board of Elections Attack 
In July of 2016, the Illinois State Board of Elections became aware of an attack on 
the Illinois Voter Registration System database.59 Through an SQL injection attack, the 
information of up to an estimated 90,000 Illinois voters was hacked, most likely by 
foreign actors.60 While concerns were immediately raised about foreign adversaries 
altering U.S. elections, the Illinois voter registration database is maintained separately 
from each county’s voter rolls. It has recently been reported that systems in thirty-nine 
states were targeted and hit by hackers.61 Luckily for the country as a whole, “the 
American voting system, with its hodgepodge of state and local polling places, is 
protected by being decentralized and disconnected.”62 So, while we often seek to connect 
systems together in search of efficiency and effectiveness, that is fortunately not the case 
for the U.S. election system, where a nationwide, networked system may have been much 
more vulnerable to manipulation. This example illustrates the virtue of a distributed, 
disconnected, “inefficient system,” if attacked by malware. 
                                                 
58 H.R., 83. 
59 Illinois State Board of Elections, “Illinois Voter Registration System Database Breach Report” 
(report, Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016), 1, www.elections.il.gov/Downloads/AboutTheBoa 
rd/PDF/08_26_16AgendaAmended.pdf.  
60 “After 2016 Election Hacking, Illinois Politicians Pose Cybersecurity Questions to Local Officials,” 
Cyberscoop (blog), June 16, 2017, https://www.cyberscoop.com/after-2016-election-hacking-illinois-will-
assess-election-system-cybersecurity/.  
61 “Russian Cyber Hacks on U.S. Electoral System Far Wider Than Previously Known,” Bloomberg, 
June 13, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-13/russian-breach-of-39-states-
threatens-future-u-s-elections.  
62 David E. Sanger and Charlie Savage, “Sowing Doubt Is Seen as Prime Danger in Hacking Voting 




Describing something as “complex” means that the whole is greater than the sum 
of its parts. A system is complex when its parts interconnect in intricate ways that may 
not be fully understood. However, complexity is not the same as chaos. Chaos is defined 
by complicated and random behavior from the iteration of a simple rule.63 “Complexity 
is the generation of rich, collective dynamical behavior from simple interactions between 
large numbers of subunits.”64 
Simple systems are composed of few parts and are easily knowable and 
predictable. Complicated systems have many parts and are still knowable, although they 
are not as simple. Complex systems are not fully knowable and evolve more than they are 
engineered.65 Complexity theory describes analytical methodologies used in various 
disciplines, including physics, mathematics, and biology. The theory assumes that 
complex systems are not in a state of equilibrium, but are perched near breakdown.66 
Once perched at this self-organized critical state, a small change anywhere in the system 
could lead to a chain reaction of events that impact the whole system. 
When systems become complex, they often behave in unexpected ways as they 
adapt to their environment. This complexity emerges from self-organizing behavior.67 
Those behaviors only occur when the system is observed in its whole and would not be 
identifiable in any of its individual parts.68 As noted by Paczuski and Bak, “this 
                                                 
63 Dean Rickles, Penelope Hawe, and Alan Shiell, “A Simple Guide to Chaos and Complexity,” 
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 61, no. 11 (November 2007): 934, 
https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2006.054254. 
64 Rickles, Hawe, and Shiell, 934. 
65 “Simple vs. Complicated vs. Complex vs. Chaotic,” NOOP.NL (blog), August 20, 2008, 
http://noop.nl/2008/08/simple-vs-complicated-vs-complex-vs-chaotic.html. 
66 Cristoforo Sergio Bertuglia and Franco Vaio, Nonlinearity, Chaos & Complexity: The Dynamics of 
Natural and Social Systems (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 282. 
67 Maya Paczuski and Per Bak, “Self-Organization of Complex Systems,” Cornell University Library, 
June 5, 1999, 1, http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/9906077.  
68 Bertuglia and Vaio, Nonlinearity, Chaos & Complexity, 272–3. 
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irreducibility is what makes systems complex.”69 To understand emergence, consider the 
features found in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Features of Emergence70 
Wholeness The whole produces properties or functions that do not 
occur or exist in the components independent of the whole. 
Novelty New properties continuously arise through an evolutionary 
process 
Downward Causality When the wholeness of the system arises, it forces 
components to change behaviors and functions in order to 
follow the laws of higher levels.  
Unpredictability The behaviors or patterns of emergence cannot be predicted 
based upon behaviors of pre-existing components. 
Irreducibility Emergence is unpredictable from its components but also 
not completely deductible to its components after the 
behavior or properties arise.  
 
The process appears to be emergent or self-organized due to the gradualness of 
the changes occurring, but it requires some type of force or energy acting on the system. 
Movements in the Earth’s crust leading to earthquakes or policy decisions that shape an 
IT environment are examples. As we find imperfections in a system, we continually make 
adjustments and improvements in order to optimize it.  
Dr. Ted G. Lewis asserts that “self-organized systems are typically nonredundant, 
nonsurge capable, single-point-of-failure systems with bottlenecks, overly concentrated 
assets, and inadequate backup capacity.”71 Natural and manmade catastrophes are 
byproducts of normal complex system behaviors.72 Small incidents cascade and become 
magnified as they travel through system linkages.   
                                                 
69 Paczuski and Bak, “Self-Organization of Complex Systems,” 4.  
70 Adapted from Huaxia, “Exploring Dynamics of Emergence,” 432–3. 
71 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 43. 
72 Ted G. Lewis, Thomas J. Mackin, and Rudy Darken, “Critical Infrastructure as Complex Emergent 
Systems,” International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism (IJCWT) 1 (January–March 2011): 3, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4018%2Fijcwt.2011010101. 
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Complex systems are often modeled as a network containing nodes, links, and a 
wiring topology that describes how links are used to connect pairs of nodes. Nodes 
represent system components and the links represent interactions between the 
components. System hubs are nodes with a higher-than-average number of links and are 
more critical than nodes with fewer links. It is the links in a system that can allow failures 
to spread throughout. With increasing connectivity (either through link density or hub 
size), SOC increases as well.73 Link density is also referred to as percolation. The more 
tightly coupled, or linked, various elements of a system are, the more damaging any 
disruption could be to the system. Networks evolving through continual addition of links 
and rewiring to optimize the network can become increasingly self-organized.74 The 
denser the network connections become, the closer it will come to maximum capacity, 
and the closer it will come to the critical point.75  
Networks are typically classified by how the links are distributed among pairs of 
nodes. Random networks are just that—formed by randomly connecting pairs of nodes.76 
Scale-free networks contain a hub with a great number of connections as well as many 
nodes that have few connections.77 Figure 1 provides simple, representative models of a 
random network and scale-free network. They are useful for studying the behavior of 
coupled (linked) systems, which is the method through which failures cascade. 
                                                 
73 Lewis, Bak’s Sandpile, loc. 1192.  
74 Lewis, loc. 1093. 
75 Lewis, loc. 1093. 
76 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 64. 
77 Lewis, 65. 
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Figure 1.  Network Types78 
Scale-free networks, those that contain many nodes with only a few connections 
along with one or two hubs that have a disproportionate number of connections, are more 
self-organized and therefore the least resilient. Hub-like structure can occur through 
preferential attachment, which creates concentration of assets and critical hubs, which are 
vulnerable.79 These types of networks “are prone to rapid propagation of faults, because 
hubs are super-spreaders: nodes that accelerate and magnify the spread of faults.”80  
Preferential attachment is a property of self-organizing networks. Random 
networks self-organize into scale-free networks as they evolve over time. This is due to 
many factors, but in the context of this thesis the drivers of self-organization are 
reduction of redundancy and cost-saving efficiency. Lewis quantifies the two main 
drivers of self-organizing networks—percolation and preferential attachment—into a 
single quantity called spectral radius, r. As SOC increases, so does r. Thus, r is a useful 
measure of self-organization. 
                                                 
78 Source: Wikipedia, s.v. “Scale-Free Network,” December 13, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/ 
index.php?title=Scale-free_network&oldid=815200489. 
79 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 44. 
80 Lewis, Bak’s Sandpile, loc. 1645. 
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D. MONOCULTURE 
Monoculture is a term that is used to describe a system that has little to no 
diversity. For instance, in agriculture, monoculture is the practice of growing only a 
single crop. Monocultures in nature, such as a species with little to no genetic diversity, 
are rare because they are vulnerable to a single attack and thus risk extinction.81 In a 
biological system, genetic diversity is what ensures much of the population will survive. 
But in a monoculture, if the dominant species or crop variety is susceptible to a specific 
threat, it has the potential to wipe out the entire population. The Irish potato famine is an 
example of a single crop species with little to no genetic diversity, all vulnerable to the 
same disease which ultimately destroyed the crops throughout Ireland.82 Consolidated IT 
environments tend to standardize hardware and software, creating a monoculture. While 
this is desirable in terms of cost savings, efficiency, and interoperability, the monoculture 
system will share vulnerabilities, which puts the whole system at risk.83 Monoculture in 
nature risks extinction of a population; diversity helps to ensure survival of a population. 
The elimination of competition and diversity also may lead to a loss of resilience. 
The interconnectedness and standardization of systems, which allows the easy exchange 
of information within an organization, also produces a situation that allows the efficient 
spread of malware throughout the entire system.84 Software monoculture (systems 
running mostly the same software) can be a threat to resilience.85 In a monoculture, an 
attack on one part is an attack on all parts, enabling large-scale failure. 
It has also been argued, however, that monoculture with strategically chosen 
diversity built in can reduce risk, but an organization must take into consideration the 
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costs and benefits of doing so. Monoculture risks can be mitigated and may be easier to 
defend than the complexity created by introducing diversity.86 Diversity is expensive and 
consumes more staff resources; however, some form of diversity may be worth the cost, 
particularly for mission-critical systems.  
E. RESILIENCE AND EFFICIENCY 
Resilience, as defined by DHS, means the “ability to adapt to changing conditions 
and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption.”87 A system’s resilience 
“depends on the ability to mitigate an unusually disruptive event that may produce a 
harmful outcome.”88 For IT environments, unwanted, harmful outcomes include 
anything that results in reduction or loss of service, data, or security. As a system grows 
in size and complexity, the individuals who maintain it are more likely to be specialists in 
particular areas, rather than generalists who understand the system as a whole. This 
compounds the problem of understanding what is happening in a system when something 
goes wrong. The increased complexity adds increased difficulties for those trying to 
establish resilience.89 
When the IT environment is small and only loosely connected, the impacts of a 
disruptive event are relatively limited. But for organizations operating tightly coupled, 
consolidated infrastructure, the consequences may be magnified due to SOC and the 
cascading impacts of linked systems and software monoculture. With limited resources 
available, DHS focuses on and advocates for implementing measures that enhance 
security and increase resilience.90  
Efficiency can be defined as producing something without waste. Most 
organizations today strive to be as efficient as possible and typically centralize functions 
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in order to do so. Redundant capabilities and excess capacity are often reduced or 
eliminated in order to save money. And this efficiency leads to fragility. But resilience 
requires excess capacity, often referred to as surge capacity. Many organizations today 
keep on hand only what is anticipated to be needed, on average, to keep operations 
running. They rely on just-in-time deliveries in order to avoid carrying the cost of 
stockpiling assets. But what happens if the there is a breakdown somewhere in the supply 
chain? It propagates through the chain, ultimately impacting the organization. In order to 
be resilient, the organization should maintain some amount of excess.  
It is the same for IT systems. Extreme optimization that runs systems at maximum 
capacity is more efficient, but cannot handle a surge in demand, which can ultimately 
cause widespread overload and failure. The conundrum is that efficiency sacrifices 
resilience, and to gain resilience you must sacrifice efficiency. Thus, efficiency and 
resilience must be balanced. 
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III. ILLINOIS IT TRANSFORMATION 
Illinois embarked on IT transformation in 2015. While IT consolidation is a 
process of optimizing systems in order to improve performance while simultaneously 
reducing costs, IT transformation typically goes further than consolidation, involving not 
just consolidation of assets, but a reimagining of the way the organization operates. IT 
transformation typically includes redesigning the organization, rethinking how 
technology supports the business, and developing a strategy to implement those changes. 
With that transformation inevitably comes consolidation of infrastructure, staff, networks, 
applications rationalization, and a drive toward enterprise solutions.  
Illinois first attempted consolidation of state information technology functions 
beginning in 2004. The consolidation was only partially completed and focused on 
hardware and network services. In 2016, the state of Illinois created a new state agency 
responsible for all IT functions, the Department of Innovation and Technology (DoIT), 
for executive branch agencies and launched a new effort to not just consolidate IT 
infrastructure, but to modernize the technology, standardize applications, and implement 
an enterprise architecture.91 While Illinois’ IT transformation is broad in scope—
encompassing establishment of a new agency, staff consolidations, financial and 
procurement process improvements, and service improvement—this section focuses 
specifically on infrastructure technology, software, and standardization. Illinois’ IT 
environment has evolved over time and is broken primarily into two phases, the current 
state, which is an assessment of the environment as it existed in 2015, and the future 
state, the desired future IT environment.  
A. CURRENT STATE 
In 2015, Illinois’ information technology environment was partially centralized as 
a result of an earlier attempt at consolidation in 2004. At that time, twenty-two of fifty-
seven state agencies had their infrastructure consolidated and managed by the Illinois 
Department of Central Management Services (CMS), while an additional twenty-five 
                                                 
91 Illinois Office of the Secretary of State, Executive Order 2016-01.  
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were not consolidated but received some services from CMS.92 The agencies 
consolidated as part of the earlier effort had the majority of their infrastructure housed in 
the centralized data center within CMS. All agencies’ applications development staff and 
support operations remained within each agency’s individual IT department.  
Illinois agencies maintained several data centers in multiple geographically 
dispersed locations, several mainframes, and thousands of midrange servers. Three of the 
data centers contained approximately 80 percent of all servers, with the remaining 
20 percent spread out across over 200 addresses in 102 cities.93 There were found to be 
about an equal number of physical and virtual servers with nearly half running different 
versions of Microsoft operating systems, with a mix of other operating systems on the 
remainder.94 Hardware was also from a variety of manufacturers, HP the most 
predominant but also Lenovo and Cisco. On top of this infrastructure, state agencies were 
running about 2,800 separate applications in numerous languages, including a large 
number in Visual Basic related, C related, and COBOL.95 Most applications were custom 
built in house.  
The backbone of Illinois’ network is the Illinois Century Network, a public, high-
speed broadband network managed by the Illinois DoIT. The Illinois Century Network 
maintains fifteen points of presence and supports internet connectivity for thousands of 
schools, libraries, universities, and state and local governments throughout Illinois.96  
The 2004 consolidation was primarily an attempt to reduce spending and resulted 
in not just a lack of investment, but a deliberate reduction in spending, which ultimately 
impacted service quality. Agencies avoided further consolidation and continued to build 
their own infrastructure and applications, designed around their own standards.  
                                                 
92 Deloitte, “State of Illinois Current State Assessment” (report, State of Illinois, 2016), 66–68, 
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93 Deloitte, 71. 
94 Deloitte, 72. 
95 Deloitte, 89. 
96 “Illinois Century Network,” State of Illinois, accessed November 26, 2017, www.illinois.gov/icn/ 
Pages/default.aspx.  
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Overall, a variety of architecture and lack of statewide governance, along with 
siloed technology operations, had created large inefficiencies, inadequate staffing, and a 
fragmented IT environment. With so many legacy systems running, it is often the case 
that only one or two staff members have the necessary skills to support them. The age of 
the systems makes them fragile and the lack of adequate staff with the skills necessary for 
support creates unacceptable risk. These systems are also difficult to extend or integrate 
with others and often do not support the modern environment users and citizens desire, 
such as online and mobile access. Maintaining so many different databases, applications, 
and infrastructures is a huge time sink for staff and often prevents deployment of newer, 
more useful technologies. 
B. FUTURE STATE PLAN 
To improve efficiency, security, and user experience while lowering the overall 
cost of doing business, the state defined a future or end-state vision of its IT environment 
and documented a strategy to get there. This plan includes an enterprise governance 
model to reduce siloes and support interoperability, reduce the number of data centers 
and servers, and employ fewer applications while also standardizing software platforms. 
These actions are intended to create a more efficient environment that is easier and less 
costly to support.  
All agency servers, security, network, storage, and database infrastructure are to 
be consolidated into the DoIT data center.97 Enterprise application standards will be 
implemented in order to standardize software languages and reduce the number of 
applications. Applications will be reduced and legacy technologies will be re-platformed 
in enterprise-wide applications whenever possible.98 And finally, Illinois’ desired future 
state includes deploying a “cloud first” strategy for backup, storage, testing, and 
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Illinois, 2016), 28. 
98 Deloitte, 24. 
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applications development, with a goal to have 70 percent of the workload in the cloud by 
2018.99  
There are four general operating models to describe the “level of process 
integration and standardization in a given organization.”100 The models are described in 
Figure 2. Illinois was operating within the “diversification” model. The desired future 
state is somewhere between coordination and unification. Core processes should utilize 
enterprise-wide systems, common processes among agencies should utilize standardized 
or shared solutions, and custom applications should be extremely limited. 
 
Figure 2.  Enterprise Operating Model101 
                                                 
99 Deloitte, 31. 
100 Deloitte, “IT Transformation Future State Enterprise Architecture Strategy,” (report, State of 
Illinois, 2016), 38. 
101 Source: Deloitte, 38. 
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A large part of Illinois’ strategy for a more centralized and efficient operation 
includes heavy use of the cloud. Cloud computing is the latest strategy in the quest for 
increased efficiency and reduced costs in IT organizations. Utilizing the cloud for storage 
and delivery of applications allows organizations to avoid large investments in 
infrastructure and unused, excess capacity. Organizations can then reduce or expand their 
usage based upon current needs, operating in the most efficient manner possible. The 
increased amounts and availability of bandwidth have made cloud services viable only 
relatively recently. Defining the cloud has often been the subject of discussion over the 
years, but NIST defines it as follows:  
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort 
or service provider interaction.102 
Service models generally fall into the following categories103: 
• Software as a Service (SaaS)—software applications are hosted on the 
provider’s infrastructure and accessed by the user through a thin client 
interface. 
• Platform as a Service (PaaS)—allows the client to access the cloud 
infrastructure in order to develop, manage, and deploy applications. 
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)—the provider hosts the infrastructure 
and the user has the ability to provision processing, storage, networks, and 
other resources.  
Deployment models include public, private, or a hybrid of the two. A public cloud 
is available to the general public over the internet and is owned and operated by a 
provider with the infrastructure maintained somewhere other than the consumer 
                                                 
102 Peter Mell and Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, Special Publication 
800-145 (Gaithersburg, MD: NIST, 2011), 2, http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecial 
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103 Mell and Grance, 2–3. 
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location.104 A private cloud is one exclusively for a single organization and may be 
hosted on or off premises and managed by either a third party or the organization.105  
Prior to the first consolidations, the state’s IT environment was highly 
decentralized and somewhat siloed. Today it is becoming increasingly centralized but has 
not yet moved to the full centralization of the desired end state, encompassing all 
infrastructure, applications, and staff. The current Illinois IT environment is evolving 
toward a highly centralized and optimized environment and will likely move toward a 
scale-free system, losing resiliency along the way. Scale-free networks are typically less 
vulnerable to random failures but much more vulnerable to targeted attacks.106 Scale-free 
networks, because of their structure, are also vulnerable to cascading failures.107 Because 
all components are linked through a centralized hub, it is much easier for malware to 
spread.  
In terms of the research question posed in Chapter I, centralization is a form of 
SOC, which reduces resilience to targeted attacks. As the Illinois IT system evolves from 
a diverse, decentralized, redundant collection of IT assets toward a monoculture, 
centralized, cloud-based, efficient collection of IT assets, it also becomes less resilient 
unless other measures are taken to reduce vulnerabilities. Centralization in a single data 
center or in the cloud and standardization of hardware and software systems increase the 
risks associated with a monoculture unless mitigated by greater security and tighter 
control of access by authorized users. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
This chapter delves into some of the mathematics involved in network theory and 
how it is used to model and study systems. This provides a means to quantify self-
organization, determine systems vulnerability and resilience, and to help understand how 
to mitigate the vulnerabilities identified. It is the system’s structure that determines how 
resilient the system is, not simply each component’s weakness (remember, the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts). We also apply these means to a representative example 
from Illinois specifically, but it could be used as an example for any system being 
centralized.  
A. QUANTIFYING SELF-ORGANIZATION 
Complex systems typically display properties captured by probability 
distributions when observing large numbers of events. Plotting the observed events 
produces an exceedence probability curve that is typically a power law. Exceedence 
probability measures the likelihood that an event will exceed a particular 
consequence.108 Power laws represent functional relationships between two quantities. A 
change in one results in a proportional change in the other. Essentially, this means that 
small events are much more likely than extreme events.109 An exponent determines the 
rate of decline, represented as q.110 The larger the exponent, the more frequent the events 
are at the low end of the consequence scale and the less frequent they are at the high-
consequence end of the scale.111 This is what Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld observed 
during the sandpile experiment. They observed small landslides much more frequently 
than large ones, following a power law curve. The objective of system design is to create 
a system with a corresponding exceedence probability curve with q as large as possible, 
because fewer extreme incidents happen for larger values of q. 
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There are two contributing factors to SOC: link density and node connectivity. As 
link density and/or node connectivity increase, so does SOC. A mathematical quantity 
called the spectral radius, r, is used to quantify SOC.112 SOC and r increase with link 
density and hub size. Higher spectral radius means SOC is present and the higher the 
spectral radius, the higher the risk.113 Most importantly, higher values of r mean lower 
values of resilience.  
Vulnerability, v, is defined as the probability of collapse when an asset such as a 
hardware or software component is stressed. System vulnerability relates to stresses such 
as monoculture, surge capacity, and weakness in nodes or links. Higher values of 
vulnerability (v) mean lower values of resilience, also. When we combine spectral radius 
and vulnerability into a product, vr, we combine the effects of SOC with the effects of 
stresses into a single measure of fragility. 
Dr. Ted G. Lewis showed that cascade resilience decreases with an increase in 
both vulnerability (v) and spectral radius (r).114 Here, v is a measure of the probability of 
a node failing due to the failure of a neighboring node.115 Consider an IT system under 
attack by malware, which spreads like a virus from one asset to another. Such spreading 
is a form of cascading, and according to the simple measure of fragility presented here, 
cascade resilience increases with a decrease in vr. Therefore, system resilience is counter-
proportional to vr: 
S ~ -vr.116 
Typical actions that occur while consolidating IT systems are represented in Tables 3 
and 4, with their effects on vulnerability and spectral radius.  
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Table 3.   Vulnerability 
Cause Effect 
Increased monoculture Increases 
Reduced surge capacity Increases 
Software flaws Increases 
Table 4.   Spectral Radius 
Cause Effect 





Resiliency has an inverse relationship with vr—it decreases as vr increases.117 
So, while high-consequence, extreme events happen less frequently than smaller-
consequence events, with increased vr the big events will be even more damaging.118 
The objective of resilient system design is to reduce v, r, or both. 
B. STATE OF ILLINOIS 
Prior to the first attempt at IT consolidation in Illinois, the Department of Central 
Management Services (CMS) housed and managed several core mainframe servers, 
which supported legacy applications. These applications include financial and accounting 
programs, payroll, personnel, timekeeping, and asset tracking. Many of these were used 
only by CMS, but some of the applications were used by multiple agencies. The majority 
of agencies housed and maintained their own hardware, network domains, and 
applications with little to no connectivity between and among agencies. 
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After 2004, the state initiated the first consolidation efforts, which were primarily 
focused on consolidating physical servers in a “lift and shift,” meaning servers were 
physically removed from approximately a dozen agencies and shifted to the CMS data 
center and connected to the CMS network domain. By 2008, the CMS data center housed 
approximately 1,400 servers. The majority of these were physical, separate servers and 
around 200 were virtualized blade servers. These agencies were now linked together, 
their servers and applications housed within the state data center. The core servers in the 
data center remained and were now linked to agency server farms co-located. Each 
agency now has hundreds or thousands of connections between agency hardware in use 
to the servers in the CMS data center. Both link density and hub size were beginning to 
increase.  
As the data center continued to be modernized, optimized, and re-wired, by 2010 
the physical servers were consolidated further. Where there were once close to one 
thousand physical servers, this was reduced to approximately 200 physical servers and 
about 1,000 virtualized blade servers. In addition to the twenty-two agencies that already 
have consolidated infrastructure in the CMS data center, an additional thirty-five that 
were not consolidated had varying levels of connection or support from CMS through 
such instances as links to the Illinois Century Network for internet connectivity or shared 
applications.  
A recent example of a portion of the Illinois network was analyzed for resilience 
by simulating cascades initiated by failure of a randomly chosen node. For example, a 
failure might be the spreading of malware. Figure 3 represents the Illinois network 
approximately as it stands now. Figure 4 is a representation of what the Illinois network 
may look like after consolidation and centralization. In both figures, self-organization is 
quantified by spectral radius, r.119  
The spectral radius of the network in Figure 3 is 3.03, which is considered low. A 
purely random network of this size would have a spectral radius of 2.8, indicating no self-
                                                 
119 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 357. 
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organization.120 As consolidation increases the connectivity of a central node—such as a 
central server in the data center—spectral radius increases. For example, in Figure 4, 
spectral radius is 4 because the hub is connected to seventeen links. Therefore, Figure 4 is 
more organized than Figure 3. Consolidation raises spectral radius from 3.03 to 4.0. 
The future state plan to centralize all IT operations and assets in one data center or 
cloud offering, with one backup location, would look like Figure 4.  
 
Figure 3.  State of Illinois Network circa 2015121 
                                                 
120 Lewis, 65. 
121 Image courtesy of Dr. Ted G. Lewis. 
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Figure 4.  Illinois Future State Representation122 
  
                                                 
122 Image courtesy of Dr. Ted G. Lewis. 
 37 
Figure 5 shows how resilience of the network in Figure 4 declines as vulnerability 
(v) increases from zero to one. Risk increases as this calculation approaches one, 
becoming prone to catastrophic failures when that number is significantly greater than 
one.123 
 
Figure 5.  Network Resiliency124 
If v is known, we can locate the Illinois network on this sloping line to determine 
its resilience. However, that is unnecessary for this analysis because we are simply 
showing that resilience declines as consolidation moves toward the hub-and-spoke 
network shown in Figure 4.  
C. CONSOLIDATION IN THE CLOUD 
Cloud computing is subject to the same general threats and vulnerabilities as an 
organization’s locally owned and administered computing environment. However, 
additional challenges exist when hardware, software, and data storage are outsourced to a 
third party. Much of what makes cloud computing attractive is also cause for concern in 
regards to security and control. But how much of the concern is simply a fear of the 
unknown? While the magnitude of potential loss does not change simply due to cloud 
computing, it is possible that there could be a change in vulnerability and threats. Are 
there vulnerabilities specific to using the cloud that may not otherwise be found in a 
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traditional IT infrastructure? Proposed indicators of cloud-specific vulnerabilities follow. 
To be cloud-specific, they must be: 
• intrinsic to or prevalent in cloud computing technology, 
• rooted in one of NIST’s cloud characteristics, 
• caused when cloud innovations make it difficult or impossible to 
implement, or, 
• prevalent in even the best cloud offerings.125 
Vulnerabilities specific to these indicators are identified in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Cloud-Specific Vulnerabilities126 
Indicator Vulnerability 
Intrinsic cloud technology 
vulnerabilities 
Virtual machine escape 
Session riding and hijacking 
Insecure/obsolete cryptography 
Rooted in NIST’s cloud characteristics 
Unauthorized access to management interface 
Internet protocol vulnerabilities 
Data recovery vulnerability 
Metering and billing manipulation 
Cloud innovation causes difficulty in 
implementing security controls 
(control challenges) 
Insufficient network-based controls (IP-based 
network zoning cannot be applied; network-
based vulnerability scanning usually 
forbidden) 
Poor key management procedures 
No standardized cloud-specific security 
metrics customers can use to monitor security 
status of their cloud resources 
Prevalent in the best cloud offerings 
Injection vulnerabilities exploited by 
manipulating service or application inputs 
Weak authentication mechanisms 
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Many of the most well-known cloud computing failures have been caused by a 
variety of failures that could impact any IT operation, but when the organization lacks 
control over the service being provided and has no failover backup, it is at the mercy of 
the cloud provider to get the service back up and running. In 2014, Dropbox suffered a 
significant outage as a result of a failed upgrade.127 Salesforce was down for nine hours 
in July of 2012 due to a brief power outage at the data center run by a cloud provider.128 
GitLab not only suffered an eighteen-hour service outage in January of 2017 due to an 
employee mistake during server maintenance, but customer production data was lost and 
unable to be recovered as well.129 In February of 2017, what was intended to be minor 
maintenance on a small number of servers at Amazon Web Services ended up impacting 
far more servers than anticipated and took down many customers for several hours.130   
Cloud security is a common concern, but many well-known breaches have been 
the result of simple configuration errors. In 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense 
accidentally exposed files stored in Amazon’s cloud storage service because of a 
mistaken configuration that allowed any Amazon Web Services user to view the files.131 
Some of these files were labeled as “Top Secret” and “NOFORN,” indicating they 
contained extremely sensitive intelligence information.132 And a misconfigured database 
is also said to be the cause of the exposure of personal information of close to 200 million 
American voters discovered in June of 2017.133 Again, this information was stored in an 
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Amazon Web Services storage bucket that was misconfigured to allow anyone to access 
the data.134 
Cloud computing suffers from the same threats and vulnerabilities as most IT 
environments. Being entirely web-based is cause for additional awareness of the business 
impact should connectivity be lost.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
Consolidation and centralization improves efficiency and reduces operational 
costs. But narrowly focusing on cost-cutting ignores the potentially dangerous threat to 
system security if consolidation ignores the perils of monoculture, reduction in 
redundancy and surge capacity, and the effects of self-organization. Complexity theory 
considerations reveal the negative side of consolidation—self-organized monoculture 
systems with giant hubs promote the spread of malware and increase the likelihood of 
total collapse. Concentration and homogenization of critical assets, elimination of 
redundancy and surge capacity, and tightly coupled systems result in vulnerabilities not 
typically considered by policymakers. 
When consolidating and centralizing to save money, system designers and 
administrators need to take special precautions to offset the downside of centralization 
and standardization with extra vulnerability-reducing precautions. This typically means 
that hardware and software systems and communication networks must be hardened even 
more against accidental and deliberate attacks. That is, vulnerability must be reduced to 
compensate for the increase in self-organization. Mathematically, this means 
vulnerability (v) must be reduced to offset spectral radius (r). 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Making the assumption that we cannot mitigate every possible threat, hazard, or 
vulnerability, we should focus on resilience. According to DHS, resilience means the 
“ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover 
from disruption.”135 But efficient systems carry inherent vulnerabilities, so how do we 
balance efficiency and resiliency to ensure system security? Since resilience of a system 
is proportional to the relationship between vulnerability and spectral radius (vr), any 
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increase in v, r, or both decreases resilience.136 Specifically, in the examples given in 
Figures 3 and 4, for a given v, r increases from 3.03 to 4.0 as consolidation and 
centralization in the data center becomes a hub-and-spoke network, as illustrated by 
Figure 4. Assuming all other factors are equal, centralization reduces resilience. The 
central data center hub is a single point of failure. 
As discussed previously and shown in Figure 5, vulnerability is counter-
proportional to resilience. So a reduction in overall vulnerability can compensate for 
increased self-organization and loss of resilience. We can balance risk and resilience by 
noting that resilience after centralization can be less than or equal to resilience before 
centralization by lowering vulnerability, v, as follows:  
 
v(data center) r(data center) ≤ v(before consolidation) r(before consolidation) 
 
substituting r(before consolidation) = 3.03, r(data center after) = 4, and dividing: 
 
v(data center) = 3.03 v(before)/4.0 v(after). 
 
In this example, a 25-percent reduction in vulnerability will compensate for the resilience 
lost due to centralization. Vulnerabilities in an enterprise system can be the result of a 
variety of issues, including design flaws in software or hardware and organizational 
policy weaknesses. A list of typical vulnerabilities in enterprise systems and 
countermeasures, which reduce vulnerability, follows in Table 6.  
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Table 6.   Typical Enterprise System Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures137 
Vulnerability Countermeasure 
Power failure Install backup power supply 
Telecom failure Buy redundant telecom service 
SYN attack Install IDS; install firewall: filter ports 
No IDS Install IDS 
Break-In Install IDS; install firewall: filter ports; 
install latest patches 
Clear password file Encrypt password files 
No backup Conduct periodic backups 
No firewall filter Install firewall: filter ports 
No antivirus Install antivirus and patches 
Clear XML/HTML Install HTTPS/SSL; install PKI/VPN 
Weak encryption Install 3DES or AES; install PKI 
Password not changed Change password periodically 
War dialing Close modem ports 
Weak LDAP in applications Install LDAP directory; modify 
applications 
Buffer overflow Install patches; update patches 
Weak OS patches Update patches; install IDS; install 
firewall: filter ports 
Open Wi-Fi ports Install IDS; install firewall: filter ports; 
encrypt Wi-Fi sessions; authenticate Wi-Fi 
users 
Open modem Close dial-up modems or use VPN 
Open FTP ports Close FTP or filter ports 
Firewall filter off Turn on firewall filtering 
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Based upon previously identified areas of vulnerability in cloud computing, in 
addition to requiring strong security protocols, organizations should pay close attention to 
account configurations in order to avoid simple mistakes that lead to large consequences. 
Organizations should also consider the consequences of hosting applications, data, and 
infrastructure in the cloud and deciding which of these require redundancy and failover 
capabilities. It may not be cost-effective to store highly sensitive or important data in a 
public cloud if the consequences of loss or the inability to access the data require on-
premises backup and failover. For centralized, government IT organizations, it may be 
just as cost-effective to host an on-premises cloud that provides service to all government 
agencies, with redundancy at a backup data center.  
Redundancy may help increase robustness against attack or component hardware 
failure. For instance, a power failure at a data center can be mitigated through backup 
generators. The consequences of a catastrophic incident at a data center can be mitigated 
through the existence of a backup data center in another location, including cloud 
services provided by a third party. Consequences from the loss of a server due to 
hardware or software failure can be mitigated through a backup server and automated 
failover. However, the cause of the failure may be a weakness in the backup as well when 
the units are the same. Similarly, a vulnerability to an attack or exploit that exists in one 
device or software application will exist in any backup as well. 
To mitigate vulnerabilities due to monoculture, introduce diversity. This practice 
is already in place in some of the most critical infrastructure in the country—commercial 
nuclear reactors.138 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission recognizes that even the best 
quality assurance does not adequately prevent common mode failures when redundant 
systems are of the same hardware and software. Designed-in diversity is used for 
commercial nuclear reactor safety in order to avoid common defects and weaknesses in 
redundant systems. If redundant systems are substantially different from one another, a 
                                                 
138 “Diversity and Defense in Depth in Digital Instrumentation and Controls,” United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, accessed February 6, 2018, https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/research/ 
digital/key-issues/diversity-defense.html.  
 45 
failure in one will not necessarily mean a failure in the other.139 This obviously comes at 
a cost, but it is critical to ensuring resilience of the system. However, organizations can 
evaluate which applications and components are most vulnerable and invest specifically 
in those areas. Focusing on areas that will have the most impact minimizes additional 
costs but, most importantly, reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic failure that disables 
the entire system due to malware and makes it more difficult for attackers.  
As previously discussed, SOC is measured by spectral radius, which increases as 
link density and hub size increase. To mitigate for this, organizations can reduce the size 
of hubs and concentration of links, thereby increasing resiliency. Operating systems 
inefficiently will keep them from becoming critical.140 Concentration of assets, such as 
consolidated data centers and other infrastructure, can result in single points of failure. 
Redundancy, such as a backup data center, can increase system robustness against a 
physical attack.141 Organizations will have to carefully weigh this against the fact that 
the high connectivity may result in decreased resiliency against cascade failures.142  
We cannot mitigate every possible threat, hazard, or vulnerability and should 
focus on actions that will increase resilience, several of which have been proposed here. 
There is a cost to many of the proposed solutions, but they are flexible enough to allow 
organizations to determine the tradeoffs they are willing to make between efficiency and 
security. 
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